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Verfassungsblog has been continuously reporting about worrying developments concerning the Polish
Constitutional Court during the past months. The siege under which this Court has been placed since the PiS
took oﬃce in Warsaw remains (luckily) an isolated case in Europe. The European Union started “rule-of-law
proceedings” under Article 7 TEU, but that attempt did not get very far. Although the situation in Poland is
unique, the speed at which the Polish Constitutional Court has been subjugated should make the rest of us think
about the regulations concerning our Constitutional jurisdictions and about the behaviour of other political actors
with respect to them. The Polish experience shows that depriving a Constitutional Court of its independence is a
matter of months. If the rest of the EU Member States want to be in a position to criticise PiS’ reforms and to
exert the necessary political pressure to revert them, they have to be sure that their own domestic situation is
irreproachable in this regard.
Recent developments in Spain have led me to these reﬂections, and I would like to describe them brieﬂy here to
sound the alarm about what happens in other European countries more discretely than in Poland, but also very
disturbingly.
The Spanish Senate has to replace four judges of the Constitutional Court whose mandates expire this year. A
reform to the Act on the Constitutional Court introduced in 2007 a new procedure to “federalise” the election of
constitutional judges by the Spanish Senate, which is supposed to be a Chamber of territorial representation.
According to the new procedure, the Parliaments of the 17 Autonomous Regions may propose two candidates
each. The Appointments Commission of the Senate chooses four candidates (they have to conduct hearings for
this purpose) and the Senate votes in a plenary session. The Constitution requires a 3/5 majority. If the
Autonomous Regions present an insuﬃcient number of candidates, the Appointments Commission of the Senate
may include other names in its shortlist. The original idea was to enhance the involvement of the Autonomous
Regions with the Constitutional Court, given that one of its competences is to resolve conﬂicts between the
Central State and the Autonomous Regions.
However, the Regions do not seem to be taking this very seriously. The deadline to present candidates had been
set at January 13th. By then, only two of the 17 Regions had presented theirs. The Senate has extended the
deadline until February 10th. Nevertheless, this extension seems quite useless: according to press reports, the
two main parties have already decided who the new constitutional judges will be . The governing Partido Popular
(PP) and the Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE) have together a 3/5 majority in the Senate. As they do
not need to include anyone else in the negotiations, they have not done so. And they have already decided the
names of the candidates.
They now only need to instrumentalise their majorities in the Parliaments of some Autonomous Regions, so that
they formally propose the candidates the parties have agreed on, and to vote in the Senate. This obviously
circumvents the purpose of the reform of 2007, and it probably explains why some Autonomous Regions do not
see the interest in proposing any candidates, and some others just await instructions. The involvement of the
Government in the appointment procedure of the Senate is shameless, despite the fact that the Government has
the right to appoint another two judges of the Constitutional Court by itself. It has to be noted that PP and PSOE
have traditionally decided the appointments of the judges of the Constitutional Court among themselves, both at
the Senate and at the Congress. They do not seem to have taken notice of the reform of 2007 and of the
substantial diversiﬁcation of the Spanish political landscape, and they continue to do business as usual.
More outrageous than this is the fact that the agreement between PP and PSOE about the new judges includes
an agreement about the Presidency and the Vice-Presidency of the Court. Despite the fact that the Act on the
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Constitutional Court expressly says that the President and the Vice-President are elected by the judges of the
Court by secret ballot, PP and PSOE do not seem to have any embarrassment in deciding among themselves
who should hold those posts. And they do not have any embarrassment in letting the press know. The next
question is, of course, how they are going to convince their preferred candidates to run for President and Vice-
President, because this is a personal choice, and how they are going to press the other judges to vote for them.
Needless to say, these arrangements between the two parties already violate the independence of the
Constitutional Court before having been put into practice. Will the judges of the Court oﬀer any resistance?
The reputation of the Spanish Constitutional Court is extremely low. Arrangements between parties,
opportunistic reforms of the Act on the Constitutional Court, unfortunate decisions of the Court itself and bad
timing have created the impression among citizens that the Court is nothing else than a puppet in the hands of
the two biggest political parties. They do not seem to have realized this and not only remain faithful to their
corrupt practices, but sharpen them. They circumvent the legal role of the Autonomous Regions, the Government
interferes with the appointment by the Senate and parties unlawfully distribute positions in the leadership of the
Court. The prestige of the Court will continue to sink in the eyes of the citizens. The legitimacy of the institution
suﬀers attacks from the Catalonian front, and yet the other constitutional organs and the parties insist on
weakening it. We will see the consequences in the future.
Unfortunately, Spain does not have any lessons for Poland in this respect. It would be interesting to hear from
colleagues around Europe about the situation of their Constitutional jurisdictions.
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